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elite captureBangladesh contributes little to global greenhouse gas emissions, yet it is one of the countries most vul-
nerable to climate change. Based on semi-structured research interviews as a conduit to a literature
review, this paper shows how the processes of enclosure, exclusion, encroachment, and entrenchment
impede the vitality of its climate change adaptation efforts. Enclosure refers to when adaptation projects
transfer public assets into private hands or expand the roles of private actors into the public sphere.
Exclusion refers to when adaptation projects limit access to resources or marginalize particular stake-
holders in decision-making activities. Encroachment refers to when adaptation projects intrude on bio-
diversity areas or contribute to other forms of environmental degradation. Entrenchment refers to
when adaptation projects aggravate the disempowerment of women and minorities, or worsen concen-
trations of wealth and income inequality within a community. In the case of Bangladeshi, climate change
policies implemented under the country’s National Adaptation Program of Action have enabled elites to
capture land through public servants, the military, and even gangs carrying bamboo sticks. Exclusionary
forms of adaptation planning exist at both the national and local scales. Climate protection measures
have encroached upon village property, char (public) land, forests, farms, and other public commons.
Most egregiously, community coping strategies for climate change have entrenched class and ethnic hier-
archies ultimately trapping the poor, powerless, and displaced into a predatory patronage system that
can aggravate human insecurity and intensify violent conflict. Planners and practitioners of adaptation
need to become more cognizant of the potential for projects to harm others, or admit complicity in
the processes of enclosure, exclusion, encroachment, and entrenchment, if they are ever to be eliminated.
 2017 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Climate change adaptation refers to altering infrastructure,
institutions, or ecosystems to respond to the impacts of climate
change. It has been recognized as necessary to the political and
economic survival of least developed countries such as Bangladesh
(Ali, 1996, 1999; Huq & Asaduzzaman, 2010). Because Bangladesh
sits at the intersection of three major river basins, and features flat
deltaic topography with low elevation, it is prone to a multitude of
climate-related events such as floods, droughts, tropical cyclones
and storm surges. Fifteen percent of its 162 million people livewithin one-meter elevation from high tide (Richard, 2007), and
annual floods inundate between 20% and 70% of the country’s land-
mass each year (Mirza, 2002). Bangladesh has high population den-
sity and rates of poverty. It is the seventh most populous country in
the world, with a density greater than one thousand persons per
square kilometer (Rawlani & Sovacool, 2011). Bangladesh also
has extreme climate variability, naturally alternating between sea-
sons of monsoon and winter drought, and the nation is dependent
upon crop agriculture, which is highly sensitive to changes in cli-
mate (Ahmed, 2006).
However, based on a mix of original interviews and a literature
review, this article documents the detrimental presence of enclo-
sure, exclusion, encroachment, and entrenchment in Bangladeshi
climate change adaptation efforts. Climate change policies have
enabled rural and urban elites to capture land. Exclusionary forms
of adaptation planning and implementation exist at national and
local scales. Climate protection measures have led to encroachment
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for climate change have, at times, entrenched existing class and
ethnic hierarchies that trap the poor, powerless, and displaced into
a nefarious system of patronage that only accelerates human
insecurity and perpetuates violent conflict.
In unveiling the so-called political ecology of climate adaptation
in Bangladesh, the paper aims to make three contributions. First, it
emphasizes the politics of adaptation in practice. It moves beyond
vulnerability mapping to assess the effects of current adaptation
efforts. Much policy research related to adaptation centers on pro-
viding credible estimates of adaptation costs, or conducting vul-
nerability assessments, or trying to guide future adaptation
strategies at the sectoral or national level. Instead, this article
investigates the empirical economic, political, ecological, and social
effects of adaptation efforts. The paper shows how the political
ecology of adaptation, namely the processes of enclosure, exclu-
sion, encroachment, and entrenchment, can distort the goals and
effects of adaptation projects. Adaptation projects can become a
flashpoint for competing interests, generating their own sets of
winners and losers—even when they might produce a net social
gain (Sovacool & Linnér, 2015). Many of these conflicts involve
those seeking to enclose agendas or exclude stakeholders from
access (Eriksen, Nightingale, & Eakin, 2015). In some situations,
adaptation projects encroach upon and subvert the intended goals
of wildlife conservation, or entrench disparities in wealth and
development. Therefore, the study shows that adaptation should
be reconceived as a political, deliberative challenge involving the
satisfaction of competing preferences, as well as a social dilemma
pitting, at times, the climatic and development goals of improved
resilience against the pressing needs of marginalized and vulnera-
ble populations.
Second, the article seeks to refine a more systematic and holistic
conceptual framework for assessing adaptation. Most work on the
political economy or ecology aspects of adaptation have tended
to focus on seven distinct themes. Some such as Sweeney,
Dobson, Despota, and Zinnbauer (2011), Schreurs and Tiberghien
(2007), and Michaelowa (2000) explore corruption in climate
change adaptation projects and the politics of lobbying. The IPCC
(2012) and Barnett and O’Neil (2010) analyze maladaptation,
where adaptation projects unintentionally lower resilience or
increase greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Ruhl (2012) studies
the winners and losers of climate change (i.e., who gets longer
growing seasons compared to who suffers drought). Füssel
(2010) and Smith, Desai, Rogers, and Houghton (2013) analyze
the ‘‘double inequity” between responsibility for climate change
(large industrialized emitters) and vulnerability to it (small devel-
oping economies). Eriksen et al. (2011) assess sustainable and
unsustainable adaptation, honing in on the consequences of adap-
tation policies and measures for other sustainable development
goals, or the contested politics of adaptation in practice (Eriksen
et al., 2015). Wilbanks et al. (2003), Wilbanks (2005), Tol (2005),
and Klein, Lisa, Schipper, and Dessai (2005) examine tradeoffs
between mitigation (stopping emissions) and adaptation (coping
with consequences). Adger, Benjaminsen, Brown, and Svarstad
(2001) and Bankoff (2001) investigate climate change and adapta-
tion as a discourse, what Taylor (2014: 3) calls an ‘‘array of discur-
sive coordinates and institutional practices” that serves to
homogenize perspectives and diminish the autonomy of outsiders.
What is missing is a more synthetic conceptual approach that inte-
grates these themes across multiple spatial dimensions (micro,
meso, macro) as well as multiple social dimensions (politics, mar-
kets and the economy, the natural environment, and local practices
and culture) and multiple themes (maladaptation, tradeoffs, vul-
nerability, discourse). Much previous research has only attempted
to untangle these separate threads sporadically; here, a conceptual
framework is presented that tries to integrate them.Third, and lastly, the study seeks to challenge modes of participa-
tion in community-based adaptation schemes. Islam and Nursey-
Bray (2017) write, for example, that communities need extended
involvement in stakeholder consultations about adaptation, they
necessitate a ‘‘greater voice.” Rahman, Sadath, and Giessen
(2016) write that community-based forest programs in Bangladesh
are ‘‘becoming more important over time” and need to better
empower lower level community actors. Although community par-
ticipation offers a valid option to counter exclusion and the domi-
nant interests of some stakeholders, this paper suggests that it can
in some situations be detrimental to the efficacy of an adaptation
project. In Bangladesh, some of the most pernicious sets of conse-
quences do not arise from the forces of global capitalism or neolib-
eralism. While these landscape pressures do play their role, instead
it is local actors—community leaders, criminals, state officials,
businesspersons, political elites—who perpetuate classism, racism,
elitism, and chronic poverty.
The disutility of local processes in community climate change
adaptation efforts has been documented in other countries. For
example, in Burkina Faso, livelihood diversification programs
seeking to bolster resilience have instead fallen victim to preda-
tory marketers who were able to buy livestock at low prices from
distressed farmers only to resell them at great profit in other areas
(Adger, Paavola, & Huq, 2006). The net effect has been to trap poor
households in a vicious cycle of borrowing, pawning, and mort-
gaging of crops (Roncoli, Ingram, & Kirshen, 2001). In Kenya, some
adaptation projects have strengthened the position and power of
local herders who resorted to violence and extortion in their
negotiations (Eriksen & Lind, 2009). In Ghana, some adaptation
projects have been primarily directed at satisfying the desires of
men at the expense of a greater workload for women (Carr,
2008). In Malawi, village leaders decided to implement particular
measures—such as flood defenses—only for their own cassava
gardens (Barrett, 2013). In Pakistan, some flood recovery efforts
have only served to further marginalize rural, agrarian land hold-
ers. Recovery interventions became an ‘‘exercise in power” that
enabled dominant social classes to ‘‘consolidate their position
within the rural hierarchy,” excluding poorer communities in
the process (Taylor, 2014). The end result has been greater levels
of debt among the poor as well as loss of control of land and
access to water.
These examples all show how local political ecology elements
can be just as influential as national or global forces in creating
inequitable or unjust outcomes—a story that is even more ampli-
fied in Bangladesh. If it is true that some stakeholders actively seek
to enclose, exclude, encroach, and entrench, or if their inclusion
indirectly contributes to these processes, than their involvement
serves to fragment and subvert the objectives of adaptation. This
demands that we refocus the discussion about stakeholders and
community involvement away from quantity (more in some cases
may not be better), to quality, so that the qualitative goals and
interests of stakeholders can be revealed. Greater ‘‘participation”
may not always produce desirable results.
2. Case selection, research methods, and conceptual approach
Bangladesh was selected as a case study due to its extreme vul-
nerability to climate related impacts. Most of Bangladesh lies in the
delta of three of the largest rivers in the world: the Ganges, the
Brahmaputra, and the Meghna, or GBM, shown in Figure 1. These
rivers have a combined peak discharge of 180,000 cubic meters
per second during the flood season, the second highest in the world
after the Amazon, and carry about two billion tons of sediment
each year (Mirza, 2002). Bangladesh is at risk not only to flooding
and tidal inundation on the coasts, but also advanced melting of
the Indian and Nepali Himalayan glaciers. This effectively means
Fig. 1. The river systems and geographic location of Bangladesh. Source: Modified from Mirza, 2002.
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‘‘both seasons;” climate change risks disrupting natural cycles of
rainfall and snowpack on the Tibetan Plateau, which feeds Bangla-
desh’s major rivers, and also increasing flooding, saltwater intru-
sion, and storm surges on the coastal belt (Belt, 2011). Moreover,
climate change is creating excess rain during the monsoon season,
and inducing a shortage of it during the winter drought.
Further compounding matters, the topography of the country is
low and flat. Two-thirds of its critical infrastructure is less than 5
meters above sea level and is therefore susceptible to naturally
occurring river and rainwater flooding and, in lower lying coastal
areas, to tidal flooding during storms. Indeed, one study docu-
mented that Bangladesh is perpetually at risk to four distinct types
of flooding (Mirza, 2002): flash floods which occur from rapid run-
off of rainwater in hilly regions; riverine floods which result when
the GBM rivers or their tributaries, which tend to rise and fall
slowly over a ten to twenty day cycle, simultaneously reach their
peaks; rain floods due to high intensity local rainfall during the
monsoon season; and storm surge floods caused by tropical storms
and cyclones which affect tidal flats and low-lying islands.
Once every four to five years, severe flooding wreaks substantial
damage to infrastructure, housing, agriculture, and livelihood
(Government of Bangladesh 2005, 2009). A severe tropical cyclone
also hits Bangladesh, on average, every 3 years resulting in exten-
sive damage to houses, livestock, and human health. Indeed, Ban-
gladesh was struck by 154 cyclones from 1877 to 1995, a rate of
more than one major cyclone per year, and also subject to 174 sep-
arate natural disasters from 1974 to 2003 (Reid, Simms, & Johnson,
2007). A severe flood in 2007 inundated 42% of the country’s land
area (62,300 square kilometers), caused 1,110 deaths, submerged
2.1 million hectares of cropland, destroyed 85,000 homes, dam-
aged 31,000 km of roads, affected 14 million people, and induced
$1.1 billion in damages (Dasgupta et al., 2010). To put the damage
in perspective, $1.2 billion is equal to all public debt listed by the
government at that time.
Disturbingly, such floods and natural disasters are projected to
get worse over the next few decades (Dasgupta et al., 2010: 4).Temperature increases of 1–3 C by 2050 will create problems
associated with water: too much of it during the monsoon seasons,
and too little of it during the winter. Temperature increases will
likely raise sea levels; increase river water levels, water logging,
erosion, and flooding during the monsoon season; and exacerbate
salt water intrusion and shortages of water for irrigation and agri-
culture during the winter (Ahmed & Alam, 2010). Agrawala, Ota,
Ahmed, Smith, and van Aalst (2003) anticipate four primary nega-
tive changes in climate and precipitation: accelerated glacier melt-
ing from increased runoff from the neighboring Himalayas,
increased rainfall during the monsoon season, sea level rise leading
to flooding under ambient conditions and severe flooding during
storm conditions, and increased frequency and intensity of
cyclones. Every area in Bangladesh is prone to at least one of these
four negative changes. A study of 136 global cities concluded that
the two likely to witness the greatest proportional increase in peo-
ple exposed to climate extremes by the year 2017 were Dhaka and
Chittagong, both in Bangladesh (Nicholls et al., 2007). Table 1
shows how climate change affects virtually every area of social,
political, or economic activity in Bangladesh. Taken collectively,
these factors combine to make Bangladesh exceptionally exposed
to the impacts of climate change.
Methodologically, to examine climate change adaptation in
Bangladesh, the study relies on two sources of data: twenty
semi-structured research interviews and data synthesized from a
subsequent literature review. Serial interviews were conducted
in 2010 and 2015 as part of a research project investigating Bangla-
deshi climate change adaptation efforts being implemented under
the Least Developed Countries Fund (Sovacool, Tan-Mullins,
Ockwell, & Newell, 2017; Sovacool, Linner, & Klein. 2017). Admit-
tedly, the focus of these interviews was not political ecology or
community vulnerability directly. Instead, the interviews related
to better understanding the benefits of, barriers to, and recommen-
dations for enhancing resilience through coastal afforestation pro-
grams in Bangladesh being funded by international donors.
However, one of the recurring interview questions asked explic-
itly about implementation challenges, especially those related to
Table 1
Areas and sectors vulnerable to climate change in Bangladesh
Climate & related elements Critical vulnerable areas Most impacted sectors
Temperature Rise and Drought North West Agriculture (crops, livestock, fisheries), water, electricity supply, health
Sea Level Rise and Salinity Intrusion Coastal Areas, Islands Agriculture (crop, fisheries, livestock), water (water logging, drinking water),
human settlements, electricity supply, health
Floods Central Region, North East Region,
Char Land
Agriculture (crops, fisheries, livestock), water (urban, industry), infrastructure,
human settlement, health, energy
Cyclone and Storm Surge Coastal and Marine Zone Marine fishing, infrastructure, human settlement, life and property
Drainage Congestion Coastal Area, South West, Urban Water (navigation), agriculture (crops)
Source: Adapted from Government of Bangladesh (2005).
Table 2
Summary data for research interviews (n = 20)
Date Institution Location Number of interviews
June 2010 Bangladesh Forestry Department Dhaka, Bangladesh 3
Bangladesh Forestry Department Noakhali, Bangladesh 1
Bangladesh Forestry Department Cox’s Bazaar, Bangladesh 1
Bangladesh Forest Research Institute Chittagong, Bangladesh 2
Bangladesh Ministry of Environment and Forests Dhaka, Bangladesh 1
Bangladesh Center for Advanced Studies Dhaka, Bangladesh 1
United Nations Development Program Bangladesh Dhaka, Bangladesh 1
United Nations Development Program Bangladesh Cox’s Bazaar, Bangladesh 1
Hatiya Island Community Noakhali, Bangladesh 1
Anwara Upazila Community Raipur Union, Bangladesh 1
Cox’s Bazaar Community Cox’s Bazaar, Bangladesh 1
Moheshkhali Village Community Cox’s Bazaar, Bangladesh 1
January 2015 Bangladesh Forestry Department Dhaka, Bangladesh 2
Bangladesh Forest Research Institute Chittagong, Bangladesh 1
Bangladesh Ministry of Environment Dhaka, Bangladesh 2
Total 20
Source: Author.
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included community leaders themselves as participants across
the locations of Chittagong, Cox’s Bazaar, Dhaka, Noakhali, and Rai-
pur. Strikingly, across the full sample of twenty interviews, issues
of vulnerability, poverty, equality, or gender were mentioned in
12, or 60%. Participants were also asked to recommend additional
reading, much of which formed the literature review of both pop-
ular and academic sources on the topic of adaptation in Bangladesh
that form the basis for the rest of the analysis. Many of these
sources are fairly recent, but whenever they were more than ten
years old, the author conducted a series of supplemental literature
reviews looking to triangulate specific claims. Thus, the research
interviews were primarily utilized as a scoping exercise, i.e., not
for offering direct quotes, but instead as a conduit for identifying
themes and the literature review. Table 2 provides an overview
of the interviews disaggregated by time, institution, and location.
To filter these data from the interviews and literature review,
and to assess the dynamics of Bangladeshi adaptation efforts, this
study draws from a conceptual approach loosely known as political
ecology. In its broadest sense, this field focuses on how power rela-
tions and structural inequalities become linked with human pro-
cesses which degrade the natural environment (Wolf, 1972).
Biersack and Greenberg (2006) argue that political ecology refers
to the ‘‘culture of production, distribution, and exchange” within
the socio-environmental system. Watts (2000) suggests that polit-
ical ecology deals with ‘‘access and control over resources and their
implications for environmental health and sustainable liveli-
hoods.” Bryant and Bailey (1997: 28–29) write that political ecolo-
gists generally accept the idea that ‘‘costs and benefits associated
with environmental change are for the most part distributed
among actors unequally” which serves to reinforce, or at timesreduce, existing social and economic inequity. Robbins (2004: 20)
contends that political ecology research ‘‘tends to reveal winners
and losers, hidden costs, and the differential power that produces
social and environmental outcomes.” Although there is great diver-
sity and variation with approaches and terminologies, political
ecology has methodologies and applications similar to those uti-
lized in political economy (Hoogvelt, 1987), environmental geogra-
phy (McCarthy, 2009), neo-Marxism (Harvey, 2003), peasant
studies (White, Borras, Hall, Scoones, & Wolford, 2012), and critical
agrarian studies (O’Laughlin et al., 2013).
Sovacool, Linnér, and Goodsite (2015) and Sovacool and Linnér
(2015) apply political ecology (and economy) concepts to climate
change adaptation specifically. Their framework, which is utilized
in this study, suggests that adaptation projects must beware of four
intersecting processes that can lower their efficacy: enclosure,
exclusion, encroachment, and entrenchment. ‘‘Enclosure” refers
to when an adaptation project transfers a public or social asset into
private hands, or expands the role and authority of a private actor
into a formerly public sphere. It relates in part to how private insti-
tutions, especially corporate actors, intensify their efforts to pene-
trate into more remote or peripheral areas (markets, geographic
territories) from which they can derive revenue. ‘‘Exclusion” often
occurs in tandem with enclosure, and it refers to when an adapta-
tion project excludes or displaces a particular group of stakehold-
ers or limits access to resources related to due process, fairness,
and procedural justice. The process of exclusion enables resources
to be appropriated or consolidated by state authorities, private
firms, or social elites. ‘‘Encroachment” refers to when adaptation
projects degrade the environment, interfere with ecosystem ser-
vices provision, intrude upon biodiversity conservation zones such
as protected areas and national parks, or counteract climate change
Table 3
Summary of the processes of enclosure, exclusion, encroachment, and entrenchment




Territorial accumulation, privatization, market
stretching, parallel bureaucratization, land grabbing
Political economy, environmental geography, public policy,
neo-Marxism, critical agrarian studies, peasant studies
Exclusion Political Marginalizing
stakeholders
Dispossession, accumulation by dispossession,
tyranny
Political ecology, climate policy, development studies
Encroachment Ecological Damaging the
environment
Commodification, subordination, forum shopping Ecology, environmental science, biodiversity conservation,
consumption studies
Entrenchment Social Worsening social
inequality
Comparative advantage, elite capture Welfare economics, environmental justice, climate justice,
gender studies
Source: Modified from Sovacool and Linnér (2015).
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of greenhouse gases. Adaptation can, because it is primarily con-
cerned with building human resilience, undermine the conserva-
tion of biodiversity or other aspects of environmental quality.
‘‘Entrenchment” refers to when an adaptation project aggravates
vulnerability or the disempowerment of women, the chronically
poor, and/or other minority groups. It ‘‘entrenches” inequality by
interfering with egalitarian systems of distribution, or by further
concentrating wealth within a community or transferring risk.
Table 3 summarizes these processes, and shows how they criss-
cross economic, political, ecological, and social dimensions as well
as various sub-processes and academic conceptualizations.
3. Results: exposing the political ecology of Bangladeshi
adaptation
Because of Bangladesh’s extraordinary susceptibility to climate
change, the Government of Bangladesh, with the support of devel-
opment partners and private actors, has invested billions of dollars
over the past few decades to manage risks. These investments have
included flood management schemes, coastal polders, cyclone and
flood shelters, and the raising of roads and highways above flood
levels (Government of Bangladesh, 2009). However, as a response
to the country’s increased vulnerability and the severity of cyclone
Sidr in 2007, the government—for the first time—developed and
implemented an integrated climate change strategy and action
plan, based on its National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA),
in 2008. A local fund of $100 million was established exclusively
for local climate change efforts.
Currently, the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF) is
tasked with monitoring and managing climate change affairs. The
government has established an inter-ministerial committee on cli-
mate change, headed by MOEF, comprised of representatives from
relevant government ministries and departments as well as key
nongovernmental organizations and research institutions. The
Department of Environment, under MOEF, has also set up a Climate
Change Cell to act as Secretariat for climate change related work
within the government. There is also a National Environment Com-
mittee, chaired by the Prime Minister and with representation
from Members of Parliament as well as government and civil soci-
ety. To coordinate these many actors, the national climate change
adaptation plan attempts to implement a ‘‘pro-poor climate
change management” strategy, prioritizing adaptation and disaster
risk reduction. It also aims to address national concerns with
respect to climate change, including food security, social protection
and health, comprehensive disaster management, infrastructure,
research and knowledge management, mitigation and low carbon
development, and capacity building and institutional strengthen-
ing (Rawlani & Sovacool, 2011).
The centerpiece of these efforts is the country’s NAPA. NAPAs
are documents registered with the United Nations FrameworkConvention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) detailing the urgent
and immediate adaptation needs of least developed countries.
They are intended to offer peer-reviewed sources of information
that provide an objective assessment of ranked climate change
adaptation needs and vulnerabilities, as well as sector-specific
costs and benefits. Bangladesh’s NAPA, in particular, calls for an
integrated set of fifteen specific adaptive measures, with the fol-
lowing five ranked in order of importance (Government of
Bangladesh, 2005):
1. Coastal afforestation
2. Expansion of drinking water supply systems
3. Land water zoning and better water management
4. Improved emergency and disaster preparedness systems
5. Construction of flood shelters
The primary actor in charge of the NAPA, the MOEF, notes that it
generated this list of prioritized actions after screening more than
40 different options and consulting with more than 100 stakehold-
ers through the UNFCCC guided process.
Though these five efforts appear sound in theory or principle, in
practice they succumb, in part or in whole, to four political ecology
processes.
(a) Enclosure: elite capture and land grabbing
Adaptation projects intended to help coastal and predominately
poor populations have instead, at times, been plagued by land pre-
dation and land grabbing. Khas (public) and char (coastal island)
lands are both at risk. To understand the process of enclosure more
fully in Bangladesh, it is first important to provide a bit of back-
ground on the history of land tenure. Interestingly, the process of
land grabbing in Bangladesh is both rural and urban, and it has
been characterized as consisting of at least two categories, land sei-
zure and land denial, and two processes, ex situ and in situ
displacement.
For instance, many rural riverine and coastal sediment regions,
constantly shifting islands called char lands, are ‘‘contested sites
ripe for power plays that uproot small producers on their rich allu-
vial soils” (Feldman & Geisler, 2012). Many urban lands are cap-
tured by elites who use corrupted public servants, the military,
and even gangs carrying bamboo sticks to forcibly coerce small
land owners to relinquish titles to their property. When an area
already owned or in possession of a group is taken over by others,
it is known as land seizure. When a group is prevented from
acquiring or accessing land to which it is entitled, it is known as
land denial (Adnan, 2013). Lastly, ex situ displacement is a process
whereby people are directly and forcibly removed from their land;
in situ displacement is when struggles for or regulation of land
indirectly leads to expulsion, such as through higher prices or
changes in the law (Feldman & Geisler, 2011).
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land seizure and denial. As Adnan (2010) documented:
The most active agencies have been government departments and
forces as well as private interest groups inclusive of commercial
land dealers and speculators, political power holders, and civil
and military officials in their personal capacities. In some parts of
the country, land grabbing has been driven by socio-political fac-
tors related to sub-national political and ethnic conflicts.
Thus, many actors have been quite effective at preventing many
Bangladeshis from owning any type of land. One study estimated
that roughly half of the rural population, and three-quarters of
the country’s total population, are landless or hold such a small
amount of land that they cannot cultivate crops (Feldman &
Geisler, 2012). Another study projects that of all public land
declared or set aside for its intended users, such as poor peasants
or indigenous communities, only 11.5% has been effectively or
legitimately disbursed (Shamsuddoha, Ullah, & Shahjahan, 2014).
As a joint report from the Human Development Research Centre
and the Association for Land Reform and Development warned,
‘‘Bangladesh has a sizeable population of indigenous communities
. . . [who] are losing their lands gradually because of lack of proper
documentation, official records, and grabbing by others” (Barkat
et al., 2007). That same study also estimated that only 5% of fishing
areas have been leased to poor fishers, with the rest (95%) going to
‘‘waterbody-grabbers.” The International Institute for Environment
and Development (Quan & Dyer, 2008) revealed that ‘‘large num-
bers of Bangladeshis suffer landlessness, and despite land reform
legislation and the abolition of intermediary landlords, land distri-
bution has becomemore unequal in recent years, as a result of sub-
stantial problems of poor governance and corruption in the
management of public land”. Climate change, perhaps understand-
ably, will only exacerbate the situation, especially for char lands,
which can disappear temporarily or permanently or reappear due
to alterations in river flow, storm surge, or sea level rise.
Unfortunately, adaptation projects themselves can become con-
duits for enclosure and land grabbing. Perhaps the most direct link
concerns the country’s attempts to promote afforestation. In addi-
tion to being part of the measures covered by Bangladesh’s NAPA,
these actions also fall under a Coastal Development Strategy (CDS),
the ‘‘lynchpin” of Bangladesh’s Integrated Coastal Zone Manage-
ment process, which is an attempt to ‘‘optimize the use of coastal
land” to reduce the risks of climate change (Islam, 2006a). Though
well intentioned, the CDS, which was implemented from 2006 to
2010, was criticized for increasing demand for land since it
decreased the availability of ‘‘protected” property for agriculture.
Moreover, property falling under the CDS was still subject to the
usual government distribution of char lands, and ‘‘tyrants” and
‘‘mostly rich” people ‘‘illegally grabbed” the land without compen-
sation and then excluded others from access (Rashid, 2014).
Further undermining the success of the CDS, concerns related to
climate change adaptation were not mainstreamed within respec-
tive sectoral planning institutions. As a result, the victims of cli-
mate change were underserved by their weak government. As
Rashid (2013) writes:
Core targets of Sixth Five Year Plan (2011–15) of Bangladesh have
been set in the context of Vision 2021. This plan acknowledges that
climate-induced coastal submergence will be one of the major
causes of population displacement. Therefore, effective steps must
be explored and adopted in collaboration with the international
community within the Sixth Plan period to mitigate problems. This
plan regretfully mentions that the poor have very little access to
government land like char lands, khas lands, water bodies etc.
There are land laws and policies to allot such land to the poor
and the landless, but in actual allocation, the interest of the pooris rarely preserved. Though this plan has set some project terms,
such as, rehabilitation of climate victim, char development and set-
tlement; implementation of such initiatives are very slow and may
take longer to reach for displaced people to access.
Poor governance, where the government is aligned with wealthy
elites in facilitating land grabs explains, in part, why after the
CDS ended, coastal villagers reported no major increase in resili-
ence or reduction in poverty. Oftentimes, people in char areas also
underwent not one but several related rounds of displacement or
dispossession (Paul & Islam, 2015).
Other interactions between climate change adaptation and land
grabbing are less direct, but no less potent. Although these do not
always correspond to climate change adaptation measures, efforts
intended to boost agricultural output or lower poverty have given
rise to intensified land predation by elite members of Bangladeshi
society. As Quan and Dyer (2008) explained:
While the complex bureaucratic procedures for land allocation are
already inaccessible to the landless, spontaneous land grabs occur
before official surveys can take place. Land grabs of char land are
frequently organized by powerful landlords (jotdars) under a
neo-feudal system using dependent peasants (lathiyals), frequently
people made landless by flooding, who may be formed into ‘‘coop-
eratives” registered under the patronage of the jotdars and given
preferential treatment in subsequent land allocation by the
landlord.
In sum, elites can use the process of climate change, and their
knowledge about where adaptation projects will be implemented,
to enclose upon land that they hope will be valuable. Some well-
connected stakeholders are able to use government divestiture of
land for climate change projects as a mechanism to ‘‘gobble up”
property and custodial rights (Raihan, Fatehin, & Haque, 2009).
Despairingly, once elites have grabbed land, they tend to hold
onto it with a tight fist, backed with violence and even financial
brokers and members of the court. After land is claimed, land grab-
bing groups frequently hire their own small militia or police force
to establish security and tenure over their land. These lathials, lit-
erally ‘‘bamboo stick-wielders,” can remain on the property over
the course of years to challenge any attempts at reclamation
(Crow & Murshid, 1994). In severe instances, they can kill protes-
tors of activists (Kotikalapudi, 2016). As time passes, claims for for-
mal property rights gain credibility, and ownership is enforced by
the courts—meaning physical force and coercion are no longer
needed. Landholders will often rent out their newly acquired land
to other poor farmers or sharecroppers who come to depend on it
for their livelihood (Lein, 2009)—a perverse and perhaps ironic
twist of fate. People, even the villagers themselves who might have
been initially displaced, come to accept the land grab as legitimate.
Similar systems of patronage—where bandits, criminals, or public
officials seize land and then use violence or force to keep it until
it slowly becomes normalized as ‘‘theirs”—have also been docu-
mented in Bangladeshi forests (Adnan, 2010) and the securing of
property for roads (Kaida & Miah, 2015).
(b) Exclusion: majoritarian and authoritarian decision-making
processes
We see the process of exclusion also affecting multiple dimen-
sions of climate change adaptation in Bangladesh, ranging from
exclusionary forms of planning or implementation at the national
scale to elite domination at the community scale.
At the national scale, the preparation of key climate documents
and the collection of data on climate change have, in some
instances, been elitist and exclusionary. For instance, the Banglade-
shi NAPA process included economists and scientists as well as
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nerable groups, their professional associations, and civil society
organizations (Huq & Khan, 2008). Authorities have historically
refused to prosecute or pursue criminal charges for the land grab-
bing activities mentioned above, dismissing claims from victims as
frivolous and limiting access to legal recourse (Roy, 2000). Further-
more, though char water bodies are an important resource for fish-
ers, national policies have historically excluded char dwellers from
land auctions, giving elites privileged access (Quan & Dyer, 2008).
On the implementation side, ethnic or religious minorities and
women have been excluded from decision-making, even when
communities try to implement components of the NAPA. To those
who have lived in Bangladesh, this might come as no surprise,
given that the country remains elitist in its local political and eco-
nomic structures, and heavily patriarchal in social structure
(Kabeer, 2011). Climate change actions in Bangladesh do not enter
neutral territory. Instead, one study cautioned that ‘‘the archetypal
situation in today’s Bangladesh villages is elite repression and non-
elite compliance;” that is, local elites come to dominate others and
utilize resources to retain their positions of power (Blair, 2005). In
some parts of Bangladesh, such as char lands or along rivers and
coasts, the system of relations between landlords and peasants
has historically operated in a feudal fashion, where ‘‘the local taluk-
dars (independent proprietors) and jotedars (superior tenure hold-
ers), acting as power bosses, use their patron-tied dependents as
lathiyals to organize violent land conflict” (Zaman, 1991). The poor
and powerless, in other words, all too often have little to no voice
in village or community decisions of importance (Afroz, Cramb, &
Grünbühel, 2016; Santos, Fletschner, Savath, & Peterman, 2014).
A final type of exclusion is often both ethnic and sexist: social
customs in Bangladesh dictate that members of the land holding
class, mostly upper caste Hindu women, refrain frommanual labor.
That is, they ‘‘almost never work in the fields” (Sarwar, Islam, &
Monzoor, 2007). Instead, it is lower caste men that do the bulk of
physical work, especially in char and riverbank communities where
women are not permitted to work outside the home (Alam, Alam,
Mushtaq, & Clarke, 2017). This has grave implications for
community-based adaptation schemes because it suggests that
much of the physical effort of digging canals, erecting flood levees,
and planting crops will be done by low-wage laborers with few
political and social rights or, perversely, access to the fruit of their
labor when completed.
(c) Encroachment: deforestation and industrial degradation of the
commons
Because of Bangladesh’s heightened vulnerability to climate
change, the land use impacts from its adaptation projects can
become quite large, leading to encroachment upon other prede-
fined uses relating to physical infrastructure, char land, forests,
farms, and other public commons. In some instances, this also
intensifies environmental degradation.
The most significant, capital-intensive intervention has focused
on the erection of polders, designed to provide protection against
storm surges, flooding, and tidal intrusion. A national Coastal
Embankment Project has existed since the 1960s, and it con-
structed a staggering 5,100 km of embankments and sea dikes to
form 123 polders protecting 1.5 million hectares of land. When
these polders began to need retrofitting and repair due to greater
intensity and frequency of storms, and drainage congestion prob-
lems, a Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project upgraded exist-
ing infrastructure and then extended it (Islam, 2006b). More
recently, in 2013 the World Bank launched the $400 million
Coastal Embankment Improvement Project, intended to rehabili-
tate 600 km of embankments in 17 polders in six coastal dis-
tricts—Bagerhat, Khulna, Satkhira, Barguna, Patuakhali, andPirojpur—in order to protect 760,000 people living within the
polder boundaries.
The Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) currently
manages an intricate network of 9,943 km of embankments,
5,111 km of drainage canals, and about 14,000 flood control regu-
lating structures with a total cost of about $2.7 billion (Dasgupta
et al., 2010). Perhaps obviously, these types of efforts encroach
upon private uses of land. The Coastal Embankment Improvement
Project, merely an upgrading of embankments over the course of
2013–20, is expected to displace more than 6,200 households
physically or economically, destroy more than 2,000 businesses,
damage 1,315 agricultural plots, and force the closure of 184 edu-
cational and religious buildings (World Bank, 2013). Other efforts
from the Local Government and Engineering Department, BWDB,
and Barind Multipurpose Development Authority attempting to
increase irrigation facilities for agriculture have stressed and
rapidly depleted groundwater levels (Islam & Nursey-Bray, 2017).
A secondary problem is that these infrastructural measures
provide unequal protection. As Feldman and Geisler (2011: 7)
write:
For several decades the Government of Bangladesh has sought to
stabilize such lands by constructing polders and flood control struc-
tures, projects largely supported by the donor community. But,
under these schemes as well, the benefits often accrue to the more
wealthy and secure members of the community, including through
the corruption that accompanies their very construction.Put another way, the construction or rehabilitation of climate-
proofing infrastructure has encroached frequently upon the land
held by poor, marginalized coastal inhabitants and protected
wealthier stakeholders further along the coast. Its construction
also siphons off resources, through corruption, to workers and
laborers associated with local elites.
Other encroachment is related to the protection of char land and
forests. For example, according to national land use policy, as soon
as coastal char land is located, it is handed over to the Forestry
Department, which serves as its custodian for at least 20 years.
Rather than circulate this land back to people, mangrove forests
are planted as part of a coastal protection measure. Only after
accretion and consolidation of silt intensifies beyond a certain
point, often taking years or even a decade, is the area behind the
mangrove belt converted into land for human settlement (Islam,
2006b). Similarly, a national Costal Afforestation Scheme ran for
more than three decades and placed roughly 35,000 hectares of
forest plantations under national protection as part of a ‘‘Coastal
Green Belt,” excluding local villagers or communities from culti-
vating the land so as not to compromise its ecological integrity
(Rahman & Rahman, 2015). In tandem, a National Land Use Policy
intends to bring one-quarter of all land across the country under
forest cover and advocates conservation of existing forested parks,
including the Sundarbans (Quan & Dyer, 2008).
A final type of encroachment relates to industrial farming, pro-
moted by the government as a measure to build economic develop-
ment and resilience among coastal zones. The government
launched the Chingri Mahal, or shrimp zone rules, in 1992 in an
effort to lure foreign investment and generate ‘‘high economic
returns” (Kartiki, 2011). These rules were followed more than a
decade later by the Coastal Zone Policy in 2005 and a Coastal
Development Strategy in 2006. These latter efforts sought ‘‘to cre-
ate conditions, in which the reduction of poverty, development of
sustainable livelihoods and the integration of the coastal zone into
national processes can take place” (Islam, 2006b). More specifi-
cally, the top two objectives of these two policies were to ‘‘promote
economic growth” and to enhance ‘‘basic needs and opportunities
for livelihoods.”
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upon the establishment of large-scale industrial enterprises such
as shrimp farming. Such activities have transformed previously
public agricultural or khas lands into sites of industrial output
owned by national and, at times, transnational corporations. Part
of this encroachment is about integrating ‘‘smallholder agricul-
ture” into global commodity chains (Adnan, 2010); part is about
boosting export earnings and attracting foreign direct investment
(Adnan, 2013).
Regardless of their intended purposes, the shrimp zone and
coastal development policies have had detrimental environmental
and socioeconomic effects. Deb and Ferreira (2016) argue that
shrimp farming has become ‘‘the major and perhaps most detri-
mental” driver behind the rapid deforestation of mangroves in
Bangladesh, especially the Sunderban mangrove ecosystem, the
largest in the world, and a significant environmental barrier
against storm surge. Over the longer term, industrial activities such
as shrimp framing could place the entire Sunderban ecosystem at
the risk of collapse (Ilman, Dargusch, Dart, & Onrizal, 2016;
Sarker, Reeve, Thompson, Paul, & Matthiopoulos, 2016). Other
adverse environmental impacts to shrimp farming include salinity
intrusion, chemical use and pollution of waterways, and prodigious
volumes of brackish water (Afroz & Alam, 2013). Socioeconomi-
cally, the policies have prioritized allotment of state lands into pri-
vate hands. As one study explains, ‘‘while the erstwhile priority
given to poor peasants continued to be nominally kept in the
books, wealthy interest groups became entitled to claim priority
in land allotment by invoking the official rules for promotion of
shrimp farming” (Adnan, 2013). Consider the situation at Polder
23, a 5,800 hectare size polder in Khulna’s Paikgacha Upazilla
(sub-district), where 84% of residents are landless as a result of
the expansion of commercial shrimp farms. As Paprocki and Cons
(2014) write:
Prior to the incursion of shrimp into the polder, residents claim that
it was possible even for sharecroppers and day laborers to achieve
household self-sufficiency by combining wage labor with farming
on the polder’s khas (common) land. Now, the majority of land
within the polder, including khas land, has been overrun with
shrimp. As a result, residents report not just a decline in the avail-
ability of nutritious foods, but a shortage of labor opportunities, an
inability to pay the fees necessary for sending children to school
and a marked increase in indebtedness both to local moneylenders
and to microcredit organizations.When asked how they felt about the affect industrial shrimp aqua-
culture had on their community, villagers used words such as
dhongsho, bilupto, shesh (‘‘destroyed,” ‘‘extinct,” and ‘‘finished”).
Afroz and Alam (2013) contend that the ‘‘chain of tenured hierar-
chy” resulting from shrimp farming has increased leasing fees ‘‘be-
yond the reach of local people” to the point that it has even
defeated the original objectives of the coastal development
policies.
(d) Entrenchment: Community disempowerment and chronic poverty
A final political ecology dimension to adaptation in Bangladesh
is entrenchment, the aggravation of disempowerment or increased
inequality across or within communities. Like our other factors,
this one also has complex linkages and affects, but coping strate-
gies for climate change are entangled with existing class and ethnic
hierarchies that not only disseminate the benefits of adaptation
unevenly, but trap many of the poor, powerless, and displaced into
a dangerous patrimonial system of insecurity and violence.
Firstly, community coping strategies can worsen gender
inequality. One case study of displacement following rapid river-bank erosion in Char Nalgonda noted that most families had to relo-
cate five times and some families shifted their homestead 25 times
since originally settling in the region (Paprocki & Cons, 2014). This
process inequitably distributed work to women. Social customs
dictate that women in the household are required to construct
and raise the household mud platform (biti), make a new oven
(chula), establish a new garden, and, if desired, build new basic
infrastructure such as tubewells and latrines (Lein, 2009). Afroz
et al. (2016) also found that in community forestry programs, com-
munity work was highly stratified by gender.
Beyond gender, issues of class, ethnicity, and village hierarchy
come into play (Afroz et al., 2016; Alam et al., 2017). After a severe
flood occurs, the typical response from villagers is to seek social
and economic support from friends and local institutions before
they approach nongovernmental organizations, aid donors, or the
government. Given the paucity of state resources in Bangladesh,
this makes sense, but it also means that victims become more sus-
ceptible to local processes, including profiteering. For instance, one
study of refugees from flood and riverbank erosion in Bangladesh
found that many villagers had to sell their cattle and household
utensils to meet simple needs such as water and food (Karim,
2014). Another examination of land expropriation in Bangladesh
noted that many char residents had to abandon homestead land,
housing materials, crops, cattle, and trees when confronted with
a disaster, selling them at cut-rate prices to local marketers
(Feldman & Geisler, 2012). A report from the University of Dhaka
comments that often after a national or local disaster, ‘‘local elites
and influential groups take advantage of the situation because local
marginalized farmers in many cases are forced into distress sell-
ing” (Mamun, 1996). The implication here is that victims can face
entrenchment not necessarily by private corporations, but by their
own neighbors.
Displaced households lacking savings or property are forced
into an even worse situation: they must go into debt, migrate, or
starve. One study of coastal hazards and community coping meth-
ods in Hatia, an island in the Noakhali district, found that those
without property, savings, poultry, or livestock—a strong major-
ity—had to take a loan from relatives, or, a more common practice,
moneylenders. According to Parvin, Takahashi, and Shaw (2008),
those who could not secure loans tended to leave the community
in search of jobs in urban areas, usually Chittagong or Dhaka. If a
job could not be found, those without access to alternatives were
usually ‘‘forced to resort to starvation, sometimes only one meal
a day, or nothing at all.”
Another older assessment of coping strategies in the
Brahmaputra-Jamuna floodplain noted, again, that the displaced
were dependent upon their kin and local groups for assistance,
and in the absence of those, they needed to rely on their friends
and relatives, or without those, relocate and starve (Haque &
Zaman, 1989). As the authors concluded, ‘‘displaced households
having no land of their own to resettle, or who cannot expect
any material assistance from their equally poor relatives, have very
limited choices” and ‘‘adjustment to displacement in the active
floodplains of Bangladesh has been conditioned historically by
social, cultural and political factors.”
Sordidly, an elaborate patronage system has arisen to exploit
this process of displacement. Many displaced persons seek permis-
sion and protection to remain in char areas as the dependent of a
village faction leader or a locally powerful chief, a matabba, or a
locally powerful boss (called a talukdar during colonial times).
These local elites provide necessary support for resettlement—in
some cases food and water, in other cases temporary land—be-
cause the landless displaced represent historically ‘‘a cheap labor
pool to work on their land” (Haque & Zaman, 1989). Some of the
displaced are also useful as loyal lathials, or bamboo-stick-
wielding hoodlums promoting the process of enclosure discussed
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are coopted by local elites and their affiliated political parties.
Such a system, despite its viciousness, seems to be particularly
widespread in Bangladesh’s most vulnerable areas. Feldman and
Geisler (2012) write that:
Although the incidence of destitute displacees is quite high in the
region, relief and rehabilitation programs are seldom undertaken
by national government or nongovernment agencies or by local
government offices . . . This assistance vacuum and the limited
options for displacees brought about an insidious dependence on
local patronage systems and set in motion. . . multi-staged dis-
placement. . .. Impoverished displacees become a cheap labor pool
of sharecroppers and agricultural workers for local talukdars
(bosses) and serve, as well, as violence enforcers of land grabbing
for one or another local faction. That is, they are transformed into
‘readily available lathiyals (clubmen, armed retainers) to organize
violent fights when necessary to gain control over newly emergent
char land.’ This perverse process, turning displacees into displacers,
is not an isolated incident.
According to one older survey, more than 50% of char villagers are
displaced and serve as landless ‘‘dependents” embroiled in seedy
patronage networks (Haque & Zaman, 1989). Another study of
forced migration in Bangladesh noted that in situations where
refugees do not have family or savings, landlords almost always
demand agricultural labor, household service, and political support
in exchange for a house plot (Indra, 2000).
Life as one of these landless, powerless, displaced people is far
from enjoyable, to put it mildly. For instance, Abul Kalam, who
used to be a professional fisher, is now a rickshaw puller living
with his family of eight in a temporary thatched shack next to
the canal of a fishery ghat (landing center for boats) (Sovacool &
Linnér, 2015: 50–51). He migrated to Chittagong city in 2008 after
he lost three acres of land due to the erosion of the Meghna. As he
says:
I shifted house three times due to erosion. My family members lived
on other land after losing assets. Erosion changes everything; our
home, livelihood and the society as well. River erosion is the curse
for us (Sovacool & Linnér, 2015: 51).
He has four sons and two daughters. Before their displacement, his
eldest son was a day laborer in a village, but now he subsists by
skinning fish. Abul’s second and third sons, and eldest daughter,
dropped out of school and are currently unemployed.
This is not the worst that can happen. Adnan (2010) researched
land struggles in the Noakhali coastal belt, where landless and dis-
placed peasant squatting on char lands is common. As he explains,
these people:
Faced recurrent violence from rival power-holders in the form of
arson, harassment, assault, rape and killings, which were usually
linked to threats of eviction from the lands under their occupation.
Furthermore, these migrant households were subject to the abso-
lute social power of the banadasyu leaders within their respective
domains, who ‘promulgated local laws’ and used violence and
intimidation to exploit and repress them. They had little option
but to suffer in silence since they needed the protection of their
own banadasyu leader against attacks from rival power-holders
seeking to grab their tenuous landholdings.
In the face of climate change, land tenure and human security for
the displaced usually depends upon pledging loyalty to one crimi-
nal boss or another. The system of patronage is inescapable.
Further, all of the displaced have political value to the matabba
and talukdar as captive voters in local and state elections, ensuring
that the mechanisms perpetuate themselves.4. Discussion: rethinking the politics, ecology, and governance
of adaptation
Within Bangladesh, enclosure, exclusion, encroachment, and
entrenchment act at multiple sites across various stakeholders.
As Table 4 summarizes, the political ecology of adaptation tran-
scends micro, meso, and macro scales with distinct underlying cau-
sal factors. At the macro scale, national policies have reoriented
efforts toward boosting resilience and enhancing exports and eco-
nomic development, practices that protect some—notably wealthy
land owners and shrimp farm industrialists—but exclude others—
notably the landless and displaced peasants. At the meso scale, at
the level of cities and communities, we see thugs and bandits
roaming the countryside to steal land or appropriate resources,
with an eye for which climate change adaptation projects make
land more valuable and worth grabbing. At the micro scale, within
neighborhoods and households, we see how family members cope
with disaster, often by delegating some of the hardest work to
women or ethnic minorities, or by taking advantage of distress sell-
ing by households that lack savings or property.
There is also a circular or cyclical nature to the interactions
among the different political ecology processes. Enclosure and
exclusion can lead to encroachment or entrenchment, or vice versa.
Afroz et al. (2016) note for instance that differences in socio-
economic status—patterns of entrenchment—can subordinate and
disadvantage community members in decision-making fora—re-
sulting in exclusion. This exclusion can affect broader political
ecology dimensions cutting across ‘‘representation, participation,
and access to natural resources” (Afroz et al., 2016). Exclusion
can also facilitate entrenchment, converting vulnerable landless
peasants—the displaced—into future perpetuators of displacement
as they become incorporated into lathials, or held as captive voters
who have pledged allegiance to particular factions. Similarly, the
local processes facilitating entrenchment, especially the consolida-
tion of wealth and privilege into a community hierarchy, enables a
power elite to emerge and engage in the ‘‘politics of reputation” or
‘‘patronage politics” at higher levels—local elites intermingle with
other influential business leaders and political representatives,
and come to create a regime that protects their shared interests,
perpetuating enclosure. As a result, Mahmud, Ahmed, and
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out to different clientele groups as an essential tool of political
management” and that ‘‘a large part of the bureaucracy is seen to
be corrupt and incompetent, which further feeds this vicious cycle
of poor governance.” The negative political ecology elements of
adaptation get institutionalized and systematized.
To be clear, many of the political ecology elements identified
are not entirely the result of local forces or factors. Instead, we
see actions in Bangladesh connected to global processes such as
the funneling of international donor money (e.g., hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars from the World Bank) into national infrastructure
projects such as polders, embankments, and canals. We witness
the desire to attract foreign direct investment driving the expan-
sion of industrial shrimp farms. Most of all, we see a global demand
for cheap labor and commodities placing pressure on national sys-
tems of Bangladeshi governance, and local systems of village hier-
archy and patronage, that place profiteering and accumulation of
wealth before the welfare of individuals, particularly the landless
and displaced.
Furthermore, because of its political ecology, many of the adap-
tation interventions undertaken in Bangladesh will require further
adaptation. The more than $3 billion placed into the construction
or rehabilitation of polders will require costly maintenance and
wide-ranging resettlement and relocation plans. Moreover, if sea
levels rise beyond the height of these protective measures, they
could even trap flood or storm surge water behind them, backfiring
and worsening the impacts of climate change. The industrial
shrimp farming and export-oriented economic development strat-
egy ostensibly intended to alleviate poverty have damaged river
embankments and facilitated the construction of sluices that allow
saline water to enter freshwater areas, leading to the intrusion of
brackish water that makes cultivation of other crops difficult
(Kartiki, 2011). Furthermore, community coping strategies predi-
cated on property and loans can become a stark liability when
those assets run out, placing family members in a predatory sys-
tem where workers pledge economic and political loyalty to clan
bosses in exchange for shelter, food, and security.
Lastly, the existence of enclosure, exclusion, encroachment, and
entrenchment in some Bangladeshi adaptation measures does not
mean that they are always present or even frequently present. Nor
does it imply that Bangladesh should abandon its adaptation
efforts. There are many adaptation projects that seem to be pro-
ducing a net social benefit despite the complex Bangladeshi polit-
ical ecology surrounding them (Ahammad, Nandy, & Husnain,
2013; Chowdhury, 2008; Rawlani & Sovacool, 2011). So, not every
adaptation project need perpetuate inequality, exclude others, or
enclose and encroach upon people’s property or livelihood.
Although political ecology processes can at times distort or mold
adaptation projects and processes to the interests of dominant
stakeholders, they do not necessarily or completely undermine or
obfuscate all of the benefits of adaptation. Even the specific cri-
tiques raised, some of them quite sobering, are aimed at a target:
improving and learning from adaptation’s political ecology so that
the least vulnerable are helped, and so that benefits and burdens
are made visible, and distributed fairly and according to represen-
tative processes. Planners and practitioners of adaptation projects
need to become more cognizant of the potential for projects to
harm others, or admit complicity in the processes of enclosure,
exclusion, encroachment, and entrenchment.5. Conclusions
In sum, this article reveals the political ecology dynamics
applied to the study of climate adaptation in practice. Plans that
may ‘‘look good on paper” can be extremely problematic in imple-mentation contexts. Adaptation efforts need politicized and issues
around the political ecology of climate change adaptation in Ban-
gladesh need recognized, let alone managed. The four parallel pro-
cesses through which adaptation can be coopted—enclosure,
exclusion, encroachment, entrenchment—are ultimately detrimen-
tal to the goals of equitable development. Such efforts become
complicit in changing resource control and capture by state, pri-
vate sector and local elite actors, as well as increasing inequalities
and undermining access to justice. In addition, ecological impacts
of adaptation practice can negatively impact sustainability and
exacerbate vulnerabilities of marginalized groups to the very sorts
processes that they seek to counter and can increase exposure of
local populations to a number of additional social and environmen-
tal stressors and challenges.
One conclusion arising from this analysis is the necessity of a
theoretical lens that is multi-scalar or polycentric. Micro or local
dynamics interact with meso or regional pressures in tandem with
macro or global trends. Emphasizing only a single scale—say, a
household practice, a community action plan, a national policy—ig-
nores and may even obscure the circulation of more complex, dee-
per political ecology forces. Another conclusion is that the research
community needs to conceptualize and develop new adaptation
pathways (and, indeed, perhaps developmental pathways) that
can avoid these failures in climate change implementation and
practice, as well as more nuanced framings of climate change
and environmental governance.
The presence and pervasiveness of some of the political ecology
elements associated with adaptation—especially the classism, vio-
lence, and feudal nature of patronage—should serve as a wakeup
call for Bangladeshi planners that they can no longer ignore the
broader social and political environment in which they operate.
For, while it is true that climate change can be described as a major
causal factor creating ‘‘descents into poverty” where households
succumb to flooding and ill-health (Sen, 2003), our research sug-
gests that community responses, and adaptive measures, can also
serve as a lever that forces Bangladeshis to descend and remain
trapped in poverty and human insecurity.Acknowledgments
This article deepens and extends arguments presented in a book
published in 2015 with Palgrave and Nature Climate Change enti-
tled The Political Economy of Climate Change Adaptation. Also,
Mohammed Mamun Or Rashid from the USAID’s Climate Resilient
Ecosystems and Livelihoods (CREL) Project and Shapan Adnan from
the University of Oxford, in addition to two anonymous reviewers,
offered extremely helpful suggestions for revision on earlier drafts
of this manuscript. The author is appreciative to ESRC for Grant EP/
K011790/1, which has supported elements of the work reported
here.References
Adger, W. N., Benjaminsen, T. A., Brown, K., & Svarstad, H. (2001). Advancing a
political ecology of global environmental discourses. Development and Change,
32, 681–715.
Adger, W. N., Paavola, J., & Huq, S. (2006). Toward justice in adaptation to climate
change. In W. N. Adger, J. Paavola, S. Huq, & M. J. Mace (Eds.), Fairness in
adaptation to climate change (pp. 1–19). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Adnan, S. (2010). Resistance to accumulation by dispossession under neoliberal
capitalism and globalization. Paper presented at the International Conference
on Global Land Grabbing at the Institute of Development Studies, University of
Sussex.
Adnan, S. (2013). Land grabs and primitive accumulation in deltaic Bangladesh:
Interactions between neoliberal globalization, state interventions, power
relations and peasant resistance. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 40(1), 87–128.
Afroz, T., & Alam, S. (2013). Sustainable shrimp farming in Bangladesh: A quest for
an Integrated Coastal Zone Management. Ocean & Coastal Management, 71,
275–283.
B.K. Sovacool /World Development 102 (2018) 183–194 193Afroz, S., Cramb, R., & Grünbühel, C. (2016). Ideals and institutions: Systemic
reasons for the failure of a social forestry program in south-west Bangladesh.
Geoforum, 77, 161–173.
Agrawala, S., Ota, T., Ahmed, A. U., Smith, J., & van Aalst, M. (2003). Development and
climate change in Bangladesh: Focus on coastal flooding and the sundarbans. Paris,
France: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Ahammad, R., Nandy, P., & Husnain, P. (2013). Unlocking ecosystem based
adaptation opportunities in coastal Bangladesh. Journal of Coastal
Conservation, 17(4), 833–840.
Ahmed, A. U. (2006). Bangladesh climate change impacts and vulnerability: A synthesis.
Dhaka, Bangladesh: Department of Environment, Climate Change Cell.
Ahmed, A. U., & Alam, M. (2010). Development of climate change scenarios with
general circulation models. In S. Huq, Z. Karim, M. Asaduzzaman, & F. Mahtab
(Eds.), Vulnerability and adaptation to climate change for Bangladesh (pp. 13–20).
London, U.K.: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Alam, G. M., Alam, K., Mushtaq, S., & Clarke, M. L. (2017). Clarke, Vulnerability to
climatic change in riparian char and river-bank households in Bangladesh:
Implication for policy, livelihoods and social development. Ecological Indicators,
72, 23–32.
Ali, A. (1996). Vulnerability of Bangladesh to climate change and sea level rise
through tropical cyclones and storm surges. Journal of Water Air Soil Pollution,
92, 171–179.
Ali, A. (1999). Climate change impacts and adaptation assessment in Bangladesh”.
Climate Research, 12, 109–116.
Bankoff, G. (2001). Rendering the world unsafe: ’Vulnerability as a western
discourse’. Disasters, 25(1), 19–35.
Barkat, A., Ara, R., Taheruddin, M., Hoque, S., Hoque, S., & Islam, N. (2007). Towards a
feasible land use policy of Bangladesh. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Human Development
Research Centre (HDRC) and the Association for Land Reform and Development
(ALRD).
Barnett, J., & O’Neil, S. (2010). Maladaptation. Global Environmental Change, 20(2),
211–213.
Barrett, S. (2013). Local level climate justice? Adaptation finance and vulnerability
reduction. Global Environmental Change, 23(6), 1819–1829.
Belt, D. (2011). Buoyant Bangladesh and the coming storm. National Geographic, 219
(5), 58–83.
Biersack, A., & Greenberg, J. B. (2006). Reimagining political ecology. Durham, NC,
USA: Duke University Press.
Blair, H. (2005). Civil society and propoor initiatives in rural Bangladesh: Finding a
workable strategy. World Development, 33(6), 921–936.
Bryant, R. L., & Bailey, S. (1997). Third world political ecology. London: Routledge.
Carr, E. R. (2008). Between structure and agency: Livelihoods and adaptation in
Ghana’s central region. Global Environmental Change, 18, 689–699.
Chowdhury, N. J. (2008). A journey towards development: The impact of local NGO
programmes on women living in the char lands of Bangladesh. Development in
Practice, 18(1), 117–124.
Crow, B., & Murshid, K. A. S. (1994). Economic returns to social power: Merchants’
finance and interlinkage in the grain markets of Bangladesh. World
Development, 22(7), 101l–1030.
Dasgupta, S., Huq, M., Khan, Z. H., Masud, M. S., Ahmed, M. M. Z., & Mukherjee, N.,
et al. (2010). Climate proofing infrastructure in Bangladesh: The incremental
cost of limiting future inland monsoon flood damage. Policy Research Working
Paper 5469. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Deb, M., & Ferreira, C. M. (2016). Potential impacts of the Sunderban mangrove
degradation on future coastal flooding in Bangladesh. Journal of Hydro-
environment Research. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jher.2016.11.005. Available
online 1 December 2016, ISSN 1570–6443.
Eriksen, S., Aldunce, P., Bahinipati, C. S., Martins, R. D., Molefe, J. I., Nhemachena, C.,
et al. (2011). When not every response to climate change is a good one:
Identifying principles for sustainable adaptation. Climate and Development, 3(1),
7–20.
Eriksen, S., & Lind, J. (2009). Adaptation as a political process: Adjusting to drought
and conflict in Kenya’s drylands. Environmental Management, 43, 817–835.
Eriksen, S. H., Nightingale, A. J., & Eakin, H. (2015). Reframing adaptation: The
political nature of climate change adaptation. Global Environmental Change, 35,
523–533.
Feldman, S., & Geisler, C. (2011). Land grabbing in Bangladesh: In-situ displacement of
peasant holdings. Paper presented at the International Conference on Global
Land Grabbing at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex.
Feldman, S., & Geisler, C. (2012). Land expropriation and displacement in
Bangladesh. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(3–4), 971–993.
Füssel, H.-M. (2010). How inequitable is the global distribution of responsibility,
capability, and vulnerability to climate change: A comprehensive indicator-
based assessment. Global Environmental Change, 20(4), 597–611.
Government of Bangladesh (2005). National adaptation program of action [NAPA].
Dhaka, Bangladesh: Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF).
Government of Bangladesh (2009). Bangladesh climate change strategy and action
plan. Dhaka, Bangladesh: MOEF.
Haque, C. E., & Zaman, M. Q. (1989). Coping with riverbank erosion hazard and
displacement in Bangladesh: Survival strategies and adjustments. Disasters, 13
(4), 300–314.
Harvey, D. (2003). The new imperialism. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
Hoogvelt, A. (1987). Globalization and the postcolonial world: The new political
economy of development. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.Huq, S., & Asaduzzaman, M. (2010). Overview. In S. Huq, Z. Karim, M. Asaduzzaman,
& F. Mahtab (Eds.), Vulnerability and adaptation to climate change for Bangladesh
(pp. 1–11). London, U.K.: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Huq, S., & Khan, M. R. (2008). Equity in national adaptation programs of action: The
case of Bangladesh. In W. N. Adger, J. Paavola, S. Huq, & M. J. Mace (Eds.),
Fairness in adaptation to climate change (pp. 181–200). Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Ilman, M., Dargusch, P., Dart, P., & Onrizal (2016). A historical analysis of the drivers
of loss and degradation of Indonesia’s mangroves. Land Use Policy, 54, 448–459.
Indra, D. (2000). Not just dis-placed and poor: How environmentally forced
migrants in rural Bangladesh recreate space and place under trying conditions.
In E. M. Gozdziak & D. Shandy (Eds.). Rethinking refuge and displacement:
Selected papers of refugees and immigrants (Vol. VIII, pp. 163–191). Washington,
DC: American Anthropological Association.
IPCC (2012). Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate
change adaptation A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Cambridge. Cambridge
University Press.
Islam, R. (2006a). Pre-and post-tsunami coastal planning and land-use policies and
issues in Bangladesh. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Integrated Coastal Zone Management
Program.
Islam, R. (2006b). Pre-and post-tsunami coastal planning and land-use policies and
issues in Bangladesh, Integrated Coastal Zone Management program. Dhaka,
Bangladesh: FAO.
Islam, M. T., & Nursey-Bray, M. (2017). Adaptation to climate change in agriculture
in Bangladesh: The role of formal institutions. Journal of Environmental
Management, 200(15), 347–358.
Kabeer, N. (2011). Citizenship narratives in the face of bad governance: The voices
of the working poor in Bangladesh. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 38(2),
325–353.
Kaida, N., & Miah, T. M. (2015). Rural-urban perspectives on impoverishment risks
in development-induced involuntary resettlement in Bangladesh. Habitat
International, 50, 73–79.
Karim, A. H. M. Z. (2014). Flood and riverbank erosion displacees: Their indigenous
survival strategies in two coastal villages in Bangladesh. Asian Social Science, 10
(4), 1–12.
Kartiki, K. (2011). Climate change and migration: A case study from rural
Bangladesh. Gender & Development, 19(1), 23–38.
Klein, R. J. T., Lisa, E., Schipper, F., & Dessai, S. (2005). Integrating mitigation and
adaptation into climate and development policy: Three research questions.
Environmental Science & Policy, 8(6), 579–588.
Kotikalapudi, C. K. (2016). Corruption, crony capitalism and conflict: Rethinking the
political economy of coal in Bangladesh and beyond. Energy Research & Social
Science, 17, 160–164.
Lein, H. (2009). The poorest and most vulnerable? On hazards, livelihoods and
labelling of riverine communities in Bangladesh. Singapore Journal of Tropical
Geography, 30, 98–113.
Mahmud, W., Ahmed, S., & Mahajan, S., 2008. Economic reforms, growth, and
governance: The political economy aspects of Bangladesh’s development surprise.
Working Paper 22. Commission on Growth and Development, The World Bank
on behalf of the Commission on Growth and Development, Washington DC.
Mamun, M. Z. (1996). Awareness, preparedness, and adjustment measures of riverbank
erosion prone people: A case study for settlement planning for disaster mitigation in
Bangladesh. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Institute of Business Administration.
McCarthy, J. (2009). Commons. In N. Castree et al. (Eds.), A companion to
environmental geography (pp. 498–514). Oxford, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Michaelowa, Axel. (2000). The strength of different economic interests in shaping
EU climate policy. Energy and Environment, 11, 277–292.
Mirza, M. M. Q. (2002). Global warming and changes in the probability of
occurrence of floods in Bangladesh and implications. Global Environmental
Change, 12(2), 127–138.
Nicholls, R. J., Hanson, S., Herweijer, C., Patmore, N., Hallegatte, S., & Corfee-Morlot,
J., et al. (2007). Ranking port cities with high exposure and vulnerability to climate
extremes. OECD Environment Working Paper No. 1 (ENV/WKP(2007) 1). Paris,
France: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
O’Laughlin, B., Bernstein, H., Cousins, B., & Peters, P. E. (2013). Introduction:
Agrarian change, rural poverty and land reform in South Africa since 1994.
Journal of Agrarian Change, 13, 1–15.
Paprocki, K., & Cons, J. (2014). Life in a shrimp zone: Aqua- and other cultures of
Bangladesh’s coastal landscape. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 41(6), 1109–1130.
Parvin, G. A., Takahashi, F., & Shaw, R. (2008). Coastal hazards and community-
coping methods in Bangladesh. Journal of Coastal Conservation, 12(4), 181–193.
Paul, S., & Islam, M. R. (2015). Ultra-poor char people’s rights to development and
accessibility to public services: A case of Bangladesh. Habitat International, 48,
113–121.
Quan, J., & Dyer, N. (2008). Climate change and land tenure: The implications of climate
change for land tenure and land policy. Land Tenure Working Paper 2. Rome,
Italy: Land and Water Division of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
of the United Nations.
Rahman, M. A., & Rahman, S. (2015). Natural and traditional defense mechanisms to
reduce climate risks in coastal zones of Bangladesh. Weather and Climate
Extremes, 7, 84–95.
Rahman, M. S., Sadath, M. N., & Giessen, L. (2016). Foreign donors driving policy
change in recipient countries: Three decades of development aid towards
community-based forest policy in Bangladesh. Forest Policy and Economics, 68.
194 B.K. Sovacool /World Development 102 (2018) 183–194Raihan, S., Fatehin, S., & Haque, I. (2009). Access to land and other natural resources by
the rural poor: The case of Bangladesh. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Sage.
Rashid, M. M. (2013). Lives and livelihoods of riverbank erosion displacees in
Bangladesh: Need for protection framework. Journal of Internal Displacement, 3
(1), 19–35.
Rashid, M. M. (2014). Political commitments and aspirations of grassroots coastal
communities: A micro-level study in Bangladesh. American Journal of Rural
Development, 2(2), 24–33.
Rawlani, A., & Sovacool, B. K. (2011). Building responsiveness to climate change
through community based adaptation in Bangladesh. Mitigation and Adaptation
Strategies for Global Change, 16(8), 845–863.
Reid, H., Simms, A., & Johnson, V. (2007). Up in smoke? Asia and the Pacific: The threat
from climate change to human development and the environment. London, U.K:
Working Group on Climate Change and Development.
Richard, M. A. (2007). Climate change and human security. In J. F. C. DiMento & P.
Doughman (Eds.), Climate change: What it means for us, our children, and our
grandchildren (pp. 161–180). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Robbins, P. (2004). Political ecology: A critical introduction. London: Earthscan.
Roncoli, C., Ingram, K., & Kirshen, P. (2001). The costs and risks of coping with
drought: Livelihood impacts and farmers’ responses in Burkina Faso. Climate
Research, 19(2), 119–132.
Roy, R. C. (2000). Land rights of the indigenous peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts,
Bangladesh. IWGIA Document No. 99. Copenhagen, Denmark: International
Work Group for Indigenous Affairs.
Ruhl, J. B. (2012). The political economy of climate change winners. Minnesota Law
Review, 97, 207–277.
Santos, F., Fletschner, D., Savath, V., & Peterman, A. (2014). Can government-
allocated land contribute to food security? Intrahousehold analysis of West
Bengal’s microplot allocation program. World Development, 64, 860–872.
Sarker, S. K., Reeve, R., Thompson, J., Paul, N. K., & Matthiopoulos, J. (2016). Are we
failing to protect threatened mangroves in the Sundarbans world heritage
ecosystem? Scientific Reports, 6. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep21234 21234.
Sarwar, M. G., Islam, R., & Monzoor, S. (2007). Women’s rights to land in Bangladesh:
Roles, limitations and transformation. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Unnayan Onneshan.
Schreurs, M. A., & Tiberghien, Y. (2007). Multi-level reinforcement: Explaining
European Union leadership in climate change mitigation. Global Environmental
Politics, 7, 19–46.
Sen, B. (2003). Drivers of escape and descent: Changing household fortunes in rural
Bangladesh. World Development, 31(3), 513–534.
Shamsuddoha, M., Ullah, M. S., & Shahjahan, M. (2014). Land acquisition for
climate-displaced communities in Bangladesh. In S. Leckie (Ed.), Land solutions
for climate displacement (pp. 159–194). London, U.K.: Routledge.Smith, K. R., Desai, M. A., Rogers, J. V., & Houghton, R. A. (2013). Joint CO2 and CH4
accountability for global warming, Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, Early Edition, July 11, 2013.
Sovacool, B. K., & Linnér, B. O. (2015). The political economy of climate change
adaptation. Basingstoke UK/New York USA: Palgrave Macmillan and the Nature
Publishing Group.
Sovacool, B. K., Linnér, B. O., & Goodsite, M. E. (2015). The political economy of
climate adaptation. Nature Climate Change, 5(7), 616–618.
Sovacool, B. K., Tan-Mullins, M., Ockwell, D., & Newell, P. (2017). Political economy,
poverty, and polycentrism in the global environment facility’s least developed
countries fund (LDCF) for climate change adaptation. Third World Quarterly, 38
(6), 1249–1271.
Sovacool, B. K., Linner, B. O., & Klein, R. J. L. (2017). Climate change adaptation and
the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF): Qualitative insights from policy
implementation in the Asia-Pacific. Climatic Change, 140(2), 209–226.
Sweeney, G., Dobson, R., Despota, K., & Zinnbauer, D. (Eds.). (2011). Global corruption
report: Climate change. London: Earthscan.
Taylor, M. (2014). The political ecology of climate change adaptation: Livelihoods,
agrarian change, and the conflicts of development. London: Routeldge.
Tol, R. S. J. (2005). Adaptation and mitigation: Trade-offs in substance and methods.
Environmental Science & Policy, 8, 572–578.
Watts, M. J. (2000). Political ecology. In T. Barnes & E. Sheppard (Eds.), A companion
to economic geography (pp. 257–275). Oxford: Blackwell.
White, B., Borras, S. M., Jr., Hall, R., Scoones, I., & Wolford, W. (2012). The new
enclosures: Critical perspectives on corporate land deals. The Journal of Peasant
Studies, 39(3–4), 619–647.
Wilbanks, T. J., Kane, S. M., Leiby, P. N., Perlack, R. D., Settle, C., Shogren, J. F., et al.
(2003). Integrating mitigation and adaptation as possible responses to global
climate change. Environment, 45(5), 28–38.
Wilbanks, T. J. (2005). Issues in developing a capacity for integrated analysis of
mitigation and adaptation. Environmental Science & Policy, 8, 541–547.
Wolf, E. (1972). Ownership and political ecology. Anthropology Quarterly, 45(3),
201–205.
World Bank (2013). Resettlement action plan. Bangladesh. Available at:
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/02/17364117/bangladesh-
first-phase-coastal-embankment-improvement-project-resettlement-plan.
Zaman, M. Q. (1991). Social structure and process in char land settlement in the
Brahmaputra-Jamuna floodplain. Man, 26(4), 673–690.
